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Abstract 
This paper models trade in dealership markets when the price grid is in discrete 
units. Strategic interaction among market makers is complex: Because prices are no 
longer determined by a zero expected profits condition, priority rules and the timing 
of offers - do market makers submit price schedules first, or do traders first submit 
their orders and then market makers set prices - have significant effects on equilibrium 
outcomes. Discreteness effectively limits competition and permits market makers to offer 
profitable quotes. In order-driven institutions where traders first submit orders, absolute 
time priority leads to the "best" price schedule, one which is "better" than that obtained 
from quote-driven institutions where brokers submit schedules first. This may explain 
the institutional structure of the NYSE. 
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University, the WFA and especially Peter Alger\, Peter Bossaerts, Ian Domowitz, Burton Hollifield and 
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1 Introduction
This paper focuses on the effects of institutional design of trading markets featuring 
discrete price grids. We explore the associated ramifications for strategic pricing and 
demand behavior when agents may be a.symmetrically informed. There is little room for 
institutional design in the canonical insider trading model. Such a model features a. set 
of agents trading claims to an asset in a competitive dealership market. Some, but not 
all, traders have private information about the asset's value. Uninformed market makers 
set a continuous price schedule which, given their information, yields them zero expected 
profits given the net order flow (see e.g. Kyle (1985)).
Pricing then is determined solely by this zero expected profit condition. When the 
pricing function is continuous, market makers cannot earn positive profits of any mag­
nitude - competing market makers would skim off all profits by undercutting by an 
arbitrarily small amount. Equilibrium then requires that each price exactly equal the 
expected value of the asset conditional on the order size. 
Consequently, there exists a. unique schedule which yields market makers zero ex­
pected profits order by order.1 Priority rules which detail how a trade is divided when 
market makers set the same price do not affect outcomes, nor does the timing of trade. 
So too, the outcome does not depend on whether the institutional design is a so-called 
quote-driven open book in which market makers first set price schedules and then traders 
select their orders, or whether it is order-driven so that traders first submit their orders 
and then market makers set prices, or whether, as on the NYSE, market makers guaran­
tee some mini1num-bid�ask<--s1)read Ul} to ·S0111e inaxi1nt1m·-trade -size, but set price given 
the order for larger transactions.2
'Queen's University, Kingston Canada. K7L 3N6. Tel: (613) 545-2289 
!California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125. Tel: (818) 356-4211 
1Glosten's (1992) limit order model yields a different schedule. Ea.ch limit order earns zero expected 
profits unconditionally, losing money to large orders and n1aking n1oney fro1n small orders. 
2See Madhavan (1992) for a co1nparison of inarket and quote-driven institutions when pricing is 
continuous. 
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When the price grid is discrete, however, market makers cannot generally set a price 
which results in zero expected profits conditional on the order size. Hence, equilibrium 
cannot be determined by a zero profit condition. Consequently, the strategic interplay 
among agents is dictated by the institutional framework. The past few years have seen 
a proliferation of different institutional designs as exchanges experiment to find the "op­
timal" design. 
In this paper, we consider two classes of institution, quote-driven and order-driven 
systems. One can interpret the quote-driven institution as an open limit order book, 
while the order-driven institution corresponds to market order submission through a 
specialist who is not required to set a binding quote for large orders. We show that the 
potential for strictly positive market maker profits means that both market maker profits 
and the effective pricing schedule (the schedule of "best prices" faced by traders) vary 
wildly with the institutional rules which dictate both the priority rule and the timing 
of trade. Consequently, a failure to capture the actual institutional arrangements which 
dictate the strategic environment can lead to misleading predictions. 
Empirical work also strongly suggests that the effects of the discrete price grid on 
strategic interaction should not be ignored. The price impact of information appears to 
be small (see e.g. Glosten and Harris ( 1989)) - perhaps $.01 to $.03 per share for a 1000 
share order. The typical price grid on the NYSE, $. 125, dwarfs this adverse selection 
component of the pricing function. The question which the empirical findings beg is why 
would agents react strategically to such small informational effects on prices, yet ignore 
the implications of the discrete price grid? Existing work either ignores discreteness, or 
treats the observed price a.s a rounded version of some "true" price (Algert (1992), Got­
tlieb and Kalay ( 1985), Ball (1988), Harris ((1986), ( 1989)), etc.), or postulates that trade 
occurs when the exogenous stochastic "true" price crosses an "eighths boundary" (Cho 
and Frees (1988)) .  In contrast, this paper does not gloss over the strategic consequences 
of discreteness to focus solely on the relatively far smaller informational effects. 
The environment we consider is standard save for the restriction that there is a min­
imum unit size for prices - agents, some of whom are informed, trade claims to a risky 
security in a dealership market. Like Glosten and Milgrom ( 1985) we impose almost no 
restrictions on the stochastic informational processes (i.e. they are not restricted to nor­
mally distributed informational events (e.g. Kyle (1985)) .  Unlike Glosten and Milgrom, 
we endogenize the order sizes of the informed. 
Two market makers compete sequentially in their price quotes. We first consider a 
quote-driven institution in which first the market. makers post price quotes and then 
traders submit orders. The first market maker posts a price for each transaction level 
at which he is willing to transact. Then a competing market maker matches or beats 
whichever quotes he chooses. Given their desired order size, traders then select the best 
price among the quotes offered. In the event that both market makers offer the best 
quote, the order is split between them according to some priority rule. 
We then consider an order-driven institution in which traders first submit orders and 
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then the two market makers sequentially set the prices at which they are willing to take 
the transaction. This institution, it turns out, features the same equilibrium outcomes 
as when the market makers guarantee a minimum bid-ask spread up to some maximum 
quantity and for larger orders set higher prices given the order submitted, as on the 
NYSE. 
In both formulations, even though market makers are "competitive" within the dis­
crete institutional environment, the discrete pricing environment does not facilitate com­
petition. Discreteness introduces a strategic advantage to market makers by limiting 
the incentives to undercut: a market maker must undercut by an entire grid unit. This 
enables market makers to earn substantially greater profits than would obtain were the 
market makers merely to "round" prices from the true value to the nearest market price 
(e.g. to the nearest eighth). Discreteness can thus explain the high price of a seat on the
NYSE. 
The quote-driven institution features an effective price schedule that is a step function 
with flat spots. Informed agents react to this price schedule by concentrating their 
trade at those transaction levels where were they to trade more, they would receive less 
favorable prices: most levels feature no informed trade. This strategic reaction by the 
informed leads to uncompetitive pricing: beating the first market maker's schedule on 
any single order size dra.ws heavy informed trade. 
The "obvious" comparative statics do not obtain. Neither market maker profits, nor 
the effective price schedule need be monotone in the probability of informed tra.de. For 
instance, when the probability of informed trade falls, to discourage undercutting on a 
particularly profitable order size, the first market maker may revise his price upward on 
another, less profitable, trade size. Informed trade would shift, making undercutting on 
the profitable order size less attractive. Consequently, even though the probability of 
informed tra.de falls, the effective price schedule may become less competitive. 
In the important case of absolute time priority, the first market maker sets his price 
schedule, which becomes the effective price schedule, to maximize his profits subject to 
the constraint that the second market maker earn negative profits undercutting on any 
set of orders. We show, however, that other priority rules may lead to more competitive 
pricing than absolute time priority, because they may encourage the first market maker 
to set low prices for some orders, on which he expects to incur losses. Throughout we 
present examples which highlight these counterintuitive results. 
The order-driven institution has a unique equilibrium. This equilibrium involves a 
mixed strategy on the part of the second market maker who, for most transaction levels, 
probabilistically undercuts the first market maker's quote. The endogenous volatility in­
troduced by this mixed pricing strategy plus the bounce from one discrete price grid point 
to another combine to make asset prices more volatile than the value of the underlying 
asset. 
The probability the second market maker undercuts provides the correct incentives 
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for insiders to trade at each of these quantities. This means that the expected effective 
price schedule must be strictly increasing in signed trade size except where the bid-ask 
spread is at a minimum. In turn, the inside trade provides the correct incentives for the 
second market maker to undercut - it leaves him indifferent between matching the first 
market maker's quote and undercutting. These joint restrictions pin down uniquely both 
the equilibrium expected effective price schedule and the insider's equilibrium trading 
strategy. Equilibrium outcomes are unchanged by Ginsi trading where market makers 
can split orders, charging different prices on each portion. Ginsi trading does not smooth 
the effective amount of discreteness in the price grid. 
On those transactions where the second market maker undercuts with positive proba­
bility - that is, on most transactions - the first market maker sets a price which exceeds 
the expected valiLe of the asset conditional on the order size by exactly .4, where a is the" 
share of the transaction ta.ken by the first market maker when both market makers offer 
the same quote. Phrased differently, informed trade is such that the expected value of 
the asset conditional on the order How plus � equals a feasible price. Since a S 1, it is not
profit-maximizing for the first market maker to set a price which makes it unprofitable 
for the second market maker to undercut. The first market maker does not just "round" 
his price quote to the nearest feasible price, but rather sets an even less competitive 
price. This is in sharp contrast to Cho and Frees ( 1988) who postulate that agents time
their trades to take place when the asset value crosses the feasible price at which they 
transact. 
The comparative statics are "intuitive". As the first market maker's share a increases, 
the two market makers offer increasingly attractive price quotes at the expense of the 
second market maker's profits. To see this, observe that from the mark-up of .4, condi-" 
tional on not being undercut, the first market maker's expected profits per share equal d 
independent of both his share a and the level of informed trade. Since the mixing second 
market maker must be indifferent between undercutting and not, his profits must then 
be exactly (l-a)d, independent of whether or not he undercuts. Note too, that as the" 
price grid d becomes finer, market maker profits fall, vanishing completely as the price 
grid becomes arbitrarily fine. This suggests that proposals to the NYSE to reduce the 
size of the price grid will result in better prices for traders. 
It is possible to compare the quote and order-driven institutions from a welfare per­
spective. When market makers set price schedules first, because of the strategic response 
of informed trade to prices, less competitive pricing obtains. In the case of absolute 
time priority (a= 1), the effective price schedule set when traders first submit market 
orders and then-,prices -are set- is --at 'least'"as co1npet-iti,re a:s that set when market makers 
submit price schedules first and then traders submit orders. Hence, both informed and 
uninformed traders strictly prefer to submit their orders first and then have the market 
makers compete according to absolute priority on price (as is essentially the case on the 
NYSE). 
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2 The Model
Risk neutral agents trade claims to a single risky asset. The risky asset's value is given 
by Ll.+8, where E(8) = 0. 8 is the current innovation to the commonly known established
value of the asset, fl.. The innovation 8 is drawn from the continuous density J(-) on
bounded support [m ,  m] , -fl.:; m < 0 < m. This distribution is assumed to be common
knowledge. Traders submit orders which are in integer multiples of round lots x > O; 
all prices set are in integer multiples of d > 0. A single trader arrives at the market
in the period. This agent must trade through one of two uninformed market makers, 
M1 and M2• The trader is informed with probability /· An informed trader observes
the innovation 8 and trades upon this information. An uninformed trader inelasticly
demands an integer number of round lots of the risky asset, t E {L, L + 1 , . . .  , H},
where L < 0 < H. The probability the liquidity trader demands tx, t E {L, . . .  , H} is
J'(t) > 0. The entire transaction is consummated at a single price. It is convenient, but
not necessary for the analysis, to assume that fl., m and m are integer multiples of the
price grid, d. Since the magnitude of the round lot unit x does not affect the analysis or 
results, we subsume it in our notation. Hence an order oft is an order of tx. 
3 Quote-Driven Institutions
Figure la illustrates the timing. First, market maker M1 selects a price schedule which 
details for each transaction level t E {L, L + 1, ... , H},3 a feasible price {p1(t): p1(t) E
{kd}�_00}, where k is an integer. Having seen JYI,'s quotes, market maker M2 can offer 
a possibly more attractive feasible price, p2 (p1 (-), t), for any transaction quantity and
win the sale4• Given these two price schedules, an informed trader selects an order size. 
Both informed and uninformed agents trade with the market maker offering the better 
quote. If pz(t) = p1 (t),5 the two market makers split the transaction, with M1 taking
fraction a > .5. This division could be probabilistic. \Ve consider sharing rules other
than absolute time priority beca,use sometimes transactions are shared by floor traders 
at the specialist's post. The effective price schedule is given by: 
{ min{p2(t),p1(t)} 
p(t) = 
max{p2( t), P1 ( t)} 
t>O 
t<O 
Equilibrium: An equilibrium is a feasible pricing function for l\1i, {pi(t)}�L; a pricing
function for M2 conditional on 111,'s price schedule, {p2(p1 ( · ), t) }�L; a choice of dealers
by informed and liquidity traders; and a set of demands by the informed, t*(8,p(·)); such
that: 
(a) M1 selects his price schedule {pi ( t )}f�r, to maximize expected profits:
ir1(Pi(·)) = L�L I1(pi(t),p2(P1(·), t)) [(1 -1)£(t)(pi(t) - Ll.)t+ 
3We focus on these quantities since, in equilibriu1n1 only these orders y.,•ill be observed, and prices for 
greater orders must only be "large or sn1all enough". 
4The analysis extends straightforwardly to additional market makers (Bernhardt and Hughson 
(1991)). 
5To reduce notation, we often use the notation p2(t) = p;(p, CJ, t) to refer to the price that M2 sets 
for order t, and P2(t) = P2(p;(-). t) to denote the equilibrium price. 
5 
l'x*(t)(p�(t) - (6 + E[olt]))t*(o,p(·))],
given M2's optimal response, {p2(pi( -), t)}{�L· E[oJt] is the expectation of 5 conditional
on an insider trading t . x*(t) is the probability an insider observes an innovation which
leads to a trade oft. Ii (Pi(t),p2(t)) is an indicator function detailing Mi's share of the
order: 
1 if P2(t) > Pi(t), t > 0 or P2(t) < Pi(t), t < 0
0 if P2(t) < p,(t), t > 0 or P2(t) > Pi(t), t < 0 .  
(b) M2 selects his price schedule {p2(Pi( -) , t)}�L to maximize expected profits:
l'X*(t)(p2(Pi(·), t*) - (6 + E[olt]))t*(o, p(·))],
where !2(·) is an indicator function detailing A1/s share of the order, !2(-) = 1 - Ii(·).
( c) An agent trading t shares maximizes profits by trading with the market maker
who offers the best price, and dividing his transaction between the two market makers, 
fraction a to the A1i and fraction ( 1 - a) to .�12 if the market makers set the same price.
(d) The informed choose order size, t*(o,p(-)), to maximize expected profits: 
t*(o,p(·)) = max{argmax,(6 + 8 -p(t))t}.6 (1 )  
The price of the zero transaction volume is not identified as it does not affect profits, 
so we assume without loss of generality: 
Assumption 1: p�(O) = Pi(O) = 6.. 
We first provide some intuitive and useful background results. First, if M2 undercuts 
Mi, he undercuts by the smallest amount possible. To undercut by more would both 
attract more informed trade and needlessly reduce rev.enues. Second, on the set of trade 
sizes where M2 undercuts, he expects a net profit. While M2 may expect to lose money 
on some trades, his expected net profit on those order levels where he undercuts must be 
positive. This result reflects the fact tha.t. Nh can always set the same prices as Mi and 
share informed trade with Mi (at a better price). Third, if A1i sets a lower price than 
6The max operator uniquely selects a particular preferred trade quantity in the probability zero event 
of indifference. 
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M2, then he must expect losses from that trade. Otherwise 1112 would profitably match 
him, because market maker identity does not affect informed trade. Last, if conditional 
on handling a given order a market maker expects losses, then the market makers set 
different prices. This again reflects that 1112 does not want to share any of M1 's losses and 
informed trade depends only on the effective price schedule. Throughout the remainder of 
this paper, we focus on buy orders; t > 0. Propositions for sell orders follow analogously. 
Proofs are in the appendix. 
Proposition 1 In any equilibrium, 
(a) M2 never undercuts 1 11 by more than d: p2(t) 2: p1(t) - d, Vt. 
(b) M2 expects positive profits from the set of transactions on which he undercuts. 
( c) On any transaction where 1111 sets a price lower than iYI2 's price, he expects losses.
( d) If the price set for a particular orde1- level is such that market makers expect
negative profits then only one market maker sets that price. 
Example 1 will illustrate that either market maker may expect to lose money on a 
given order. 
Proposition 2 An equilibrium exists in which the effective price schedule is monotone 
increasing in quantity demanded: p*(t) 2: p*(t - 1) .  The price schedule is strictly mono­
tone increasing at trade levels where there is injonned trade. 
A pure strategy equilibrium follows because agents move sequentially with the in­
formed trader moving last. Ea,ch agent has a best response among the finite number 
of possibly optimal alternatives. Equilibria with non-monotonic effective price schedules 
may also exist. Equilibrium non-monotonicities can occur only at orders which M1 does 
not handle. Such transaction levels feature no informed trade so that 1111 will be undercut 
by M2• Since 1111 is undercut he does not care how high his initial quote is. 
The effective price schedule is a step function with flat spots (see Figure 2a). The
informed maximize profits by trading as much as they can at a given price. At other 
transaction levels, market makers recognize they are trading with an uninformed trader, 
and hence earning positive expected profits. In equilibrium, however, it is not profitable 
to offer better prices for those trade sizes, for that would draw informed trade. 
Corollary 3 Informed demand, t*( 8, p( ·) ), is monotone increasing in 8 .  The innovation 
space, [m, m] can therefore be partitioned into
m = 8� < 8� < . . .  < 8�, = m, 
where if 8 > 0, t*(8, p(·)) 2: 0 and for 8 E [8i,8;'+1), t*(8, p(·)) = t{, and ti< ti+1· That 
is, 8£ is the smallest signal resulting in a trade of ti. 
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Proposition 4 The bid-ask spread is always positive, even for the smallest orders. If 
t > 0 then P*(t) > 6. If t < 0 then p"(t) < 6. 
There is a positive bid-ask spread at all transaction levels even if there is arbitrarily 
little private information or the probability that a given trader is informed is arbitrarily 
small. The intuition is that if a market maker sets a price without an adverse selection 
component, p( t) = 6, he does not gain from the uninformed, and will lose needlessly to
the informed who observe small innovations, 181 < d. It is only profitable for the informed 
to trade on such information if there is no adverse selection component to price. 
Proposition 5 If there is not absolute time priority, z.e. if a < 1, then both market 
makers expect to earn positive profits in equilibrium. 
The next proposition shows how to construct the equilibrium in the case of absolute 
time priority: Jl,![1 sets his schedule to maximize his profits subject to the constraint that
it is not profitable for li12 to undercut him on any set of orders so that l'i11 handles every 
transaction, and l'i12 earns no profits. 
Proposition 6 Suppose that there is absolute time priority, i.e. a = 1 .  If the price
schedule satisfies 6 � 3d :<.:: p1(t) :<.:: 6 + 3d for all t E {L, L + 1 , . . . , H}, then M1
selects his price schedule, { pi(t) }�L' to maximize profits subject to the constraint that 
undercutting by li12 on any set of transaction levels is unprofitable. Further, since M1 
handles every transaction in equilibrium, he has no incentive to update his price schedule 
after M2 has moved. 
li11 's price schedule must make it unprofitable for l'i12 to undercut on any set of trans­
actions, rather than just making it unprofitable to undercut on any single transaction. 
M2 may find it unprofitable to undercut on one transaction because that order would 
then draw heavy informed trnde. M2 may do better to beat li11 's quotes on several 
orders, expect to lose money on those levels with informed trade, but make it up from 
uninformed trade at other levels. 
For most assets, trading only occurs within the bounds provided in the proposition. 
We have been unable to prove the more general theorem, but it is difficult to imagine 
that given absolute time priority it is ever the case that _M1 sets a schedule other than 
that given by the-solution to the program above. -It requires ·that it be profitable for M1 
to set a very uncompetitive price schedule despite the fact that he will be undercut. 
Corollary 7 When there is absolute time priority so that the conditions of proposition 5 
hold, M1 's price schedule is monotone increasing in transaction size, t: lh ( t) ::0: p1 ( t - 1) .  
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Surprisingly, absolute time priority need not lead to the most competitive price sched­
ule consistent with profit maximizing by the market makers, the one which minimizes the 
losses of liquidity traders (due to the adverse selection). Example 1 illustrates that while 
absolute time priority maximizes the incentives of M2 to undercut, more competitive 
schedules may obtain when M1 has a share a < 1 and expects to incur a loss condi­
tional on handling some trades. It also demonstrates that the first market maker's price 
schedule need not be monotone in signed volume if a # 1. It suggests that there are no
comparative statics results with respect to the priority rule. Example 1 shows that the 
equilibrium can possess the following counterintuitive features. 
(a) M1 's expected profits need not increase with increases in his share, a; M2 's ex­
pected profits need not fall with increases in a. 
(b) The effective price schedule Pa(·) may become less competitive as a increases; 
absolute priority need not lead to the most competitive pricing. 
( c) JYI1 may expect losses from handling some trade sizes.
( d) M1 's price schedule, p1 ( t) , may not be monotone increasing in ordei· size, t .
( e) Market maker p1·ofits can rise with increases in  the probability of informed trade,
I· 
(f) The effective price schedule, p_1(-), may become more competitive with increases
in the probability of informed trade, 'I· 
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Example 1: Equilibrium strategies and profits 
as a function of J:Vl1 's share, a when market makers set prices first
J\11 's share M1 's strategy M2's reaction Equilibrium prices Insider trade M, M2 Insider 
O'. {p1 (1 ), P1 (2)} {p2(l), p2(2)} {p(l ), p(2)} (round lots) profits profits profits --
O'. < .619 {10,11} {10,1 1} {10,11} 1 .84a .84(1 - a) 1 
. 619 < O'. < .8 {9,10} {-,10} {9,10} 1 .08 + .4a .4(1 - a) 2 
O'. > .8 {10,10} {10,-} {10,10} 2 -.4 + .80'. .8(1 - a) 2 
The price grid is in units of d = 1 and 6 = 0 .  The asset shock 8 can take on two values ±(11 - c) , E arbitrarily small with equal
probability; liquidity traders buy (sell) either 1 or 2 round lots with probabilities £(±1) = .4, €(±2) = .l; and the probability a
trader is informed is "! = .8.
If his share is sma.ll enough, J\11 can earn greatest profits by setting high prices of p1(1) = 10, p1 (2) = 1 1 .  If J'.12 matches
p1 (l) = 10, p1(2) = 11, then J'.11 receives a[(.2)(.4)(10) - (.8) (.5) (1 1- 10) + (.2)(.1)(11)(2)] = .84a and M2 receives .84(1 - a).
However, !vii can earn .32 from undercutting ,�11 with p2(1) = 9, p2(2) = 10, taking all sales, losing money on transactions of 1
share and making money on transactions of 2 shares: if transaction prices of p(l) = 9, p(2) = 10 a.re set, the insider prefers to
buy a. single share. Hence if a > .52/.84 � .619, J'.12 has an incentive to undercut on both transaction sizes. 
If a > .619 and J'.11 sets p1 (1) = 10, p1 (2) = 10, he expects to earn -.4 +.Sa. Since the informed trade two lots in this case, J'.12
matches only on trades of a single unit and expects to make .8(1 - a). However, if J'.11 sets p1 (1) = 9, P1(2) = 10, he expects
to earn -.08 + .4a. M2 matches only on trades of two round lots and expects to make .4(1 - a) . For a <  .8, M1 sets the very 
competitive prices of p1 (1) = 9, p1 (2) = 10, a.nd for a >  .8, J'.11 sets a. slightly less competitive schedule, P1 (l) = 10, P1 (2) = 10.
(a) Absolute time priority, a = 1, does not generate the tightest bid-ask spreads
because for less extreme priority rules Jl.![1 sets prices for some orders for which he expects 
to lose money. The intuition for the humped relationship between a and the effective
price schedule is the following: for small a, A!f1 need not set a competitive schedule 
because M2 gains enough from sharing orders to make undercutting unattractive. For 
larger a, the profits from sharing are lower so that M2 would undercut p1 (1) = 10, 
p1 (2) = 11 with p2(1) = 9, p2(2) = 10. To avoid being undercut on every transaction,
M1 must set a schedule for which he expects to lose money on orders of either 1 or 2 
round lots. For smaller a, he prefers to have the heavy liquidity trade at 1 round lot to
himself and incur slightly heavier insider trading losses by setting p1 (1) = 9, P1 (2) = 10. 
For sufficiently larger a, M1 does not mind sharing liquidity trade at 1 unit because he 
receives the lion's share. He prefers to set a less competitive schedule in which losses to 
informed traders are less: p1 (1) = 10, P1 (2) = 10.
(b) Clearly, this implies that there need not be a. monotonic relationship between 
M1 's share of the order if he sets the same price as lvf2, a, and his profits. If M1 receives
too large a. share, the incentive for Jl.![2 to undercut increases enough that to discourage 
undercutting M1 must adjust his price schedule downward. 
( c) Consequently, no monotonic relationship need exist between the probability a
trader is informed, /, and either Jl.!f1's profits or the effective price schedule. More in­
formed trade reduces the incentive for Jl.![2 to undercut A!f1, so that the share a that M1 
receives must be larger for Jvf2 to have an incentive to offer a. better price schedule. 
(d) M�s expected profits exceed M{s if and only if .75 > a >  .619.
(e) Were the example altered slightly so that €(1) = .39, £(2) = .1, £(3) = .01,
and a were sufficiently high, then A!f1 would set prices p1 (1) = 10, p1 (2) = 12, p1 (3) = 
11; his price schedule would not be monotone in quantity although the effective price 
schedule, p( l ) = 10, p(2) = 11, p(3) = 11 would be. Jl.![1 does not have to worry a.bout
M2 undercutting p1 (3) = 11 because that would draw informed trade, and the gain in 
uninformed trade is small. D 
Bernhardt and Hughson (1991) construct examples in which the second market maker 
expects negative profits conditional on taking a particular order. Finally, one can show 
that as the price grid becomes finer, the effective price schedule can feature greater 
or smaller bid-ask spreads and that market maker profits can either rise or fall. The 
reasoning is similar to that for a or I· As the grid becomes finer, the amount by which 
M2 must undercut is reduced. This can encourage undercutting where none occurred 
before, but undercutting by less may also follow because Jl.![2 undercuts by as little as 
possible. In turn, Jl.![1 considers these strategic effects when choosing his price schedule. 
Since the strategic effects are ambiguous, then so too are the effects on profits. However, 
the following limiting result does obtain: 
Proposition 8 As the price grid becomes arbitrarily fine, then A!f1 's expected profits go 
to  zero, order by order. 
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Intuitively, as the grid becomes arbitrarily fine, undercutting affects aggregate market 
maker profits by arbitrarily little so that l\lh can appropriate any market maker profits. 
M/s profits go to zero with the grid size if there is additional competition from other 
market makers (see Bernhardt and Hughson (1991)). 
It is the discreteness in the price grid which leads to positive market maker profits. 
If the price schedule is continuous, then J1;f1 cannot earn positive profits of any magni­
tude - M2 would skim off all profits by undercutting by an arbitrarily small a.mount, 
cream skimming without affecting informed trade. In equilibrium with a continuous price 
schedule, M1 sets each price exactly equal to the expected value of the asset conditional
on the order size. 
4 Order-Driven Institutions
Figure 1 b illustrates the timing. First a trader arrives at the market and submits an 
order t. Neither market maker knows whether this trader is informed. M1 then sets a.
feasible price at which he is willing to take the other side of that trade, p1(t) E {kd}�_00, 
where k is an integer. Having seen M1 's quote, J1![2 can offer a possibly more attractive
feasible price p2(p1(t), t) and take the trade. The market maker offering the best price
wins the transaction, where if p2(t) = p1(t), the two market makers split the order with
M1 taking fraction a 2': .5.
Equilibrium demands a mixed pricing strategy from 1\1[2 in order to provide the right
trading incentives for the informed. An informed agent, whose trading strategy deter­
mines the profitability of the market makers' schedules, strictly prefers that M2 make 
more attractive offers. In turn, the trading strategy of the informed must leave JY!2 indif­
ferent between beating f\1,'s quote to obtain the entire transaction and matching M,'s 
price and sharing the transaction. The only way for the informed agent's trading strategy 
to be consistent with market maker pricing and vice versa is for f\12 to adopt a mixed 
pricing strategy7. Because equilibrium outcomes a.re unaffected by the assumption, to 
reduce notation we assume that f\11 adopts a. pure strategy; we only consider mixed 
pricing strategies for 1112. Later we detail how the a.na.lysis extends. Let w2,(kd) be the
probability that f\12 sets price p2(t) = kd. 
Equilibrium: An equilibrium is a. feasible price for ea.ch transaction level t a.t which
M1 is willing to accept the order, pi(t) E {kd}�_00; a vector of probabilities of feasible
prices for ea.ch transaction level t at which J1;f2 is willing to take the trade conditional on
the price, p1(t), set by f\11: {w�1(kd I p1(t))}�_00; a.nd a set of demands by the informed,
t* ( 8), such that:
(a) For each possible order received, t = . . .  - 1, 0, 1, 2, . . ., the pnce set by M1, 
Pi ( t) E { kd} k°�-oo, maximizes his expected profits:
7Were M2 to undercut for sure on trade t \vhere equilibriu1n demanded a inixed strategy, then "more" 
informed traders would V11ant to trade t. But then it \voul<l be strictly less profitable for lvl2 to undercut 
than to match ... 
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+ l'x*(t)t*(o)(P1(t) - (t> + o)))lt], 
where the rational expectations, conditioned on the transaction size, are taken over M2 's 
optimal price choice, p�(t), and 8. 
(b) The second market maker selects { w�1( kdlp1 (t) )}�_00 to maximize expected prof­
its: 
x((l -')')C(t)(hl - 6)t +-1x*(t)E[t*(8)(kd - (6 + 8)) 1t]).
The first term on the right hand side is the expected profit from trading with the unin­
formed; the second is the expected loss trading with the informed. 
( c) The informed choose order size, t*( 8), to maximize expected profits:
t*(o) = max{argma�:,(6 +ii - Ep,(t)[p(t)])t}.
Propositions 7-1 1  characterize the properties that any equilibrium must have. We 
first show that as long as lvf1 's share, a, is less than one, that ea.ch market maker expects
strictly positive profits from each order. This implies that the probability that M1 is 
undercut is less than one. 
Proposition 9 In equilibrium, unless there is absolute time priority (i. e. a < l),
(a) Each market maker expects strictly positive profits .from any price he charges. 
(b) Consequently, the probability that 1\11 handles the transaction is strictly positive. 
( c) And M1 never undercuts .�12 in equilibrium: p2 ( t) = p( t).
We now provide the analog for Proposition 3: there is a strictly positive bid-ask 
spread at all transaction levels. The intuition is again that if a market maker sets a price 
of 6, he does not gain from the uninformed, and with positive probability he will lose
needlessly to some informed who receive small signals, 18 1 < d. This result contrasts with
that of Easley and O'Hara. (1987) who find no adverse selection component for small 
transactions only because they consider a sparse finite support for the signal space so 
that the informed want to submit large orders despite a positive bid-ask spread. 
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Proposition 1 0  Equilibrium prices feature a strictly positive adverse selection compo­
nent, even for the smallest transactions. If t > 0 then p( t) > L'J.. If t < 0 then p( t) < L'J..
The next result details that the only order sizes, 0 < t :S JI, with no insider trade
have pricep(t) = L'l.+d. In turn, for there to be informed trade at those greater quantities
where p1 (t) > L'J. + d, the expected effective price schedule must be strictly increasing in
t. 
Proposition 1 1  Define T1 > 0 to be the maximum trade size t such that p1(t) = L'J. + d.
(a) For transactions t = 1, 2, . . . T1 - l 1 p1 ( t) = L'J. + d and there is no informed trade.
(b) For greater transaction quantities, t = T1, T1+1, ... , JI, the probability the trader
is informed is strictly positive. 
( c) The expected effective price sched·ule is strictly monotone increasing in trade size:
where the expectations are ta.ken over 1\12 's price. 
( d) If M2 undercuts Nfi, he loses money conditional on trading with an informed
trader. 
These results contrast sharply with those generated by the quote-driven institution: 
recall that there the informed trade only at a few transaction levels and that because 
there is no mixing, the effective price schedule is a step function with flat SP,ots. When 
market makers set schedules first, mixing over price schedules does not affect informed 
trade because an informed trader can see the schedule realization before submitting an 
order. 
It is clear from Proposition 9 that the same equilibrium outcomes obtain were ea.ch
market maker initially to set a transaction level T > 0 such that provided the order size
does not exceed T the market maker guarantees to accept the order at the minimum bid 
price of L'l.+d. For greater quantities, traders submit their orders and then market makers 
make their (higher) price offers. With this formulation, the guarantee is T = T1• Informed
trade is unaffected by the guarantee so the equilibrium outcome must be unchanged. This 
formulation captures the practice on the NYSE: the specialist for a stock guarantees prices 
for sufficiently small orders. The guarantee is to take a trader's buy (sell) order at the 
specified bid (ask) price provided the order size does not exceed the specified bound. 
Corollary 1 2  Informed demand, t*(i5), is monotone increasing in the signal, 8 :  15 > 8'
implies that t*( 8) :'.". t*( 8'). The innovation space, [m, m] can be partitioned by 
C* C* (* / d C* C* <* -rn < uL < uL-l < ... < uy{ = -c ; = uy1 < uy1+1 < . . . < vu< m. 
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For DE (-d,d) the insider does not trade; for 0 <DE [D;,D;+1), t*(D) = t; for 0 >DE 
[D;_1, D;), t*( D) = t .  
The existence of signals Dr; and Dr, requires that a round lot transaction has an
adverse selection component of only d. If there is "too" little liquidity trade then T1 is
0: each order size features informed trade and the difference between the minimum ask
price and � exceeds d. In this case, the minimum bid-ask spread set by M1 is at least
3d. 
An insider seeing signal D; > 0 is just indifferent between trading t round lots and
t + 1. The value of the extra round lot just balances the cost of the price increase on the
first t lots:
(� + D; - E[p(t + l)]) = (t + l)(E[p(t + l)] - E[p(t)]).
Our next result is that if i\!12 undercuts, be undercuts by the minimum necessary to
take the entire transaction. Second, if he undercuts with positive probability, M2 must
be indifferent between undercutting and not. 
Proposition 1 3  If for some transaction level t, !112 sets more than one price with posi­
tive probability in equilibrium, then 
(a) M2 must e.vpect the same profits from each price. 
(b) M2 either matches 1Yl1 's q1wte or 1mderrnts by by d: p2(t) E {p1(t),P1(t)- d}. 
( c) If M2 undercuts 1\11 with positive probability, i.e. if w;,(p1 ( t) - dlp1 ( t)) > 0, then
'IX"(t) a(p1(t) - � - ( . )0( ) ( )E[Dlt]) = d. 1 - 7 ' t +"IX* t 
(2)
Condition ( c) that M2 must be indifferent between undercutting and not provides
strong restrictions on the equilibrium. The left hand side of (2) is 1\11 's profit conditional
on not being undercut. This must exactly equal the price grid size, d. Equation (2) 
underlies the following key result. 
Proposition 1 4  For t> T1, if p1(t) = p1(t + 1) ... = p1(t + j), then the greater is the 
trade size, the greater· are 1\11 's expected profits: 
K1(t) = tw;(t)d < 11"1(t+l) = (t+l)w;(t+l)d < ... < 11"1(t+j-1) = (t+j-l)w;(t+j-l)d, 
where w;(t) is redefined as the equilibrium probability that M2 undercuts M1 on order t .  
On trade size t + j, an upper bound on 1111 's profits is the grid size, d. The likelihood of 
insider trade falls with the trade size in such a way as to keep the expected innovation from 
the perspective of the market makers (who do not know whether the trader is informed) 
constant: 
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'Yx"(t) E['lt] - -yx"(t+l) E['lt l] -n•(t)+(!--y)l(t) u - -yx•(t+l)+(!--y)l(t+l) u + - ' ' '
- 'YX"(t+j-l) E[51t + . - l] - 'YX'(t+j-!)+(!--y)l(t+j-1) J ' 
The intuition is that M2 must undercut with decreasing probability as the order size 
increases to maintain the equilibrium incentives for some informed traders to transact 
at each trade level. Hence as order size increases, JY/1 receives a greater portion of the 
same (per share) pie, so that his expected profits per share are increasing in the order 
size. In turn, the informed's trading strategy must leave !112 just indifferent between 
undercutting and not. Consequently, the conditional probability of informed trade must 
fall as the order size increases. In sharp contrast, with the quote-driven institution, 
recall that the insider trades as much as possible at a given price and will not trade other 
quantities. 
!111 does not set a very competitive price schedule (see Figure 2b). If the probability 
of being undercut is positive8, then (see equation 2) his profit-maximizing quote exceeds 
the expected value of the asset conditional on the order size by exactly � ='.". d: 
d
P1 (t) = Ll. + E[51t] + -.a 
Since a :S 1, JY/1 does not just "round" his price quote up to the nearest feasible price
above the asset's expected value, but rather sets an even less competitive price. Further, 
for a of 1, M2 earns positive profits when he undercuts. Note that one implication is 
that the informed trader's strategy is such that E[51t] + � is a feasible price. If for two
different (positive) transaction levels !112 undercuts 1111 with positive probability, then 
the difference in the expected innovation is exactly equal to the difference in the prices 
that M1 sets, kd. 
Propositions 9 and 1 1  combine to have strong implications for market maker profits: 
l. For small order sizes T_1 < t < T1, 1111 's profits per share exceed those of M2, i.e.,
o:d > (1- o:)d.
2.  For any larger order where M2 does not undercut /111 with positive probability, 
M1 's expected profits per share exceed fl.12 's, but are bounded from above by d. 
3.  For most large transactions t > T1, 1112 undercuts /111 with positive probability. On
these orders 1111 's expected profits per share, conditional on not being undercut 
exactly equal the grid size d. Hence, J1!!1 's unconditional expected profits per share
are (1 - w;(t))d. lYh must be indifferent between undercutting and not. Hence,
/ill2's expected per share profits are (l�a)d, independent of the quantity traded as
well as, whether or not he undercuts. 
8In practice on the NYSE, for inost orders \:vith prices p1 (t) > � + d, the transaction price does not 
increase by d with each additional round lot, suggesting that the probability of undercutting is generally 
positive. 
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Either market maker may expect greater profits from a given transaction. M1 expects 
greater profits than 1112 if and only if 1112 is not too likely to undercut, i.e. if w;(t) < 2""
-I.
The probability of undercutting, w;(t), is pinned down by the equilibrium condition for
the insider which determines his order choices (which must, in turn, leave M2 indifferent 
between beating and matching M1 's price). 
In the case of absolute time priority, M,'s expected profits are zero. It cannot be 
profitable for M2 to undercnt M1 or he would always do so. But then M1 conld have 
obtained those profits by setting the lower price as well. Hence with absolute time priority, 
additional market makers have no effect on outcomes: the same equilibrium expected 
price schedule obtains. The order of play of the market makers is also irrelevant: the 
same prices obtain when the market makers set prices simultaneously, but one market 
maker is given absolute priority as when market makers select schedules sequentially and 
tl1ere is absolute ti111e priority. 
The next proposition details that there is only one expected effective price sched­
ule consistent with optimization by both the informed trader and the market makers. 
Intuitively were there multiple equilibrium price schedules then there would exist some 
greatest transaction level t where the expected effective prices differ. But then, for the
schedule with the higher price, informed trade would be less. But then there would be a 
greater incentive for market makers to set lower prices, a contra.diction. 
Proposition 1 5  The expected effective price schedule, {Ep,(t)[p(t)]}�r,, is umque. 
Corollary 1 6  The equilibrium trading strategy by the informed, { o;g�Z' is unique. 
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Example 2: Equilibrium strategies and profits 
Case A: Traders submit orders first Case B: Market makers set prices first 
Trade Pi Prob. E[p] Signals leading Pr(informed) Equil. price: 
size t P2 < P1 to trade size t given t p(t) = P1(t) 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 < 6 < 1.000 1.000 0 
1 1 0.000 1.000 Never 0.000 1 
2 1 0.000 1.000 1.000 < 6 < 1.832 0.333 1 
3 2 0.722 1.278 1.832 < 6 < 3.206 0.452 2 
4 2 0.241 1.759 3.206 < 6 < 4.000 0.323 2 
The price grid is in units of d = 1 and there is absolute time priority (a = 1 ).
6 = 0, and fi is uniformly distributed on [-4, 4]. 
Signals leading Pr( informed) 
to trade size t given t 
0<6<1 1.000 
None 0.000 
1<6<3 0.545 
None 0.000 
3<6<4 0.375 
The probability of an insider is / = .325, and the uninformed are equally likely to buy or sell 1, 2, 3, 4 units. 
Expected value 
given t 
0.500 
0.000 
0.981 
0.000 
1.138 
Case A: Insider expected profits are 2 * 1.s�2-1(!(1.832 + 1)- 1) + 3*3"06�1.832(!(3.206+1.8:32) - 1.278) + 4 * 4-34206(!(4 +
3.20G) - 1.759) = 2.916. His unconditional expected profits are .325 * 2.916 = .948. 
Of that a.mount, only 1.288 comes at the expense of NI1• l\I1's gains from uninformed a.re Hl(l - 0) + 2(1 - 0) + .278 * 3(2 -
0) + .759 * 4(2 - 0)) = 2.685.
M1's expected profits a.re therefore .675 * 2.685 - .325 * 1.288 = 1.393, which exceed those of the informed trader. The 
uninformed also lose an additional �(.722 * 3 + .241*4) = .783 to M2, yielding 3.47 in losses. Since a= 1, 1\12 expects zero
profits conditional on ta.king a transaction. 
Case B: Since a= 1, M1's strategy is the equilibrium pricing function. If l\I2 attempts to undercut to p2(3) = 1 at transaction 
level 3, all informed traders who receive signals fi > 1 trade 3 units, and 1\12 makes losses because the expected value of the
asset given t = 3 is 1.477. 
Insidler expected profits are reduced to 2.5. Since a = 1, 1\11 's gains from the uninformed equal total uninformed losses,
4.25 > 3.47. l\11  's expected profits increase to .675 * 4.25 - .325 * 2.5 = 2.056 from 1.393.
1\11 cannot set a less competitive schedule. If M1 sets p1 = {l, 2, 2, 2}, 1\12 can undercut at t = 2 and t = 3 with p2 = {l, 1, 1, 2}, 
lose at t = 3, but profit overall. When / is instead .375, equilibrium prices are the same, but M1 would now expects losses at 
t = 2 (the expected value is 1.09), even though there is absolute time priority. 
The construction of the equilibrium is as follows: S*( 4) = 3.206 leaves M2 indifferent
between undercutting p1(4) = 6 + 2 and not:
(1 - o:)((l - 1)R(4)(p1(4) - 6) + 1x*(4)(p, (4) - 6 - E[.514]))
= (1 - 1) €(4)(P1(4) - 1  - 6) + 1x*(4)(p1(4) - 1  - 6 - E[.514]),
where x*(4) = f?!0) dF (S), and E[.514]) = E[SIS*(4) <S S  m]. Similarly, 8*(3) leaves M2 
indifferent to undercutting M1 on trades of 3 round lots: 
(1 - o:)((l - 1)R(3)(p1 (3) - 6) + 1x*(3)(p,(3) - 6 - E[.513] ) )
= (1 - 1)1'(3)(p,(3) - d- 6) + 1x*(3)(p,(3) - d - 6 - E[.513]) ,
where x*(3) = f::(w dF(S), and E[ol:3]) = E[818*(:3) < 8 s 8*(4)] ; 8*(2) = 1.
In turn, the probability that j\;[2 undercuts j\;[1 on trades of 3 or 4 round lots w(3) , w( 4) 
pin clown 8*(3) , 8*(4) by leaving the insider indifferent who sees such asset innovations
indifferent between the quantities which he trades: 
2( 8*(3) - P1 (2) )  = 3( 8*(3) - (p1 (3) - w(3)d) ) ;  
3(8*(4) - p1(3) - w(3)d) = 4(8* (4) - (p1(4) - w(4)d)) . 
The expected profits of the first "competitive" market maker actually exceed those
of the informed trader. Indeed, since p1 (3) = 2 > 1.832 = 8*(3), j\;[1 expects a profit
from trading with some informed traders: such informed traders hope to make positive
profits when j\;[2 undercuts j\;[1 . In contrast, whenever A12 undercuts A11, conditional on
trading with an informed trader, j\;[2 always expects negative profits. Note lastly that
M1 's profits fall when he raises his quote from 6 + 1 to 6 + 2, but increase when his
quote stays constant. 
Observe that when market makers set prices first and then traders submit their or­
ders that the effective price schedule is less competitive than when the timing is reversed: 
traders face "worse" prices. In Section 5 we show tha.t this is a general result on institu­
tional design. D 
We now turn to examining the effects of changing the exogenous parameters of the 
model on the price schedules set. The first finding is tha.t the smaller is M2 's share 1 -o:, 
the more attractive it is for 11;[2 to undercut .M1. Consequently, both A11 and M2 set
tighter bid-ask spreads, the smaller is o:. This contrasts sharply with the ambiguous 
effects of o: on price schedules when market makers set prices before traders submit 
orders. 
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Proposition 1 7  The greater is a, the smaller is the bid-ask spread set by each market 
maker, and hence the smaller is the expected effective market bid-ask spread. All traders, 
both informed and uninformed, strictly prefer institutions with greater time priority. Let 
a' > a" . Then
If M2 ever undercuts M1 's price on some order size t then the greater is a, the strictly
"better" is the equilibrium expected effective price for that trade level: Ep,(t)[Pa'(t)] < 
Ep,(t) [pa,,(t)] . Traders always prefer that M1 receive greater priority because it increases
M2 's incentive to undercut and offer a better price. An immediate corollary is that 
Corollary 18 Aggregate market maker profits are decreasing in JYI1 's share a .  
The reduction in market maker profits is at J\1, 's expense (propositions 9, 1 1). 
For similar reasons less informed trade a.nd finer price grids lead to "better" schedules 
and hence are preferred by both informed and uninformed traders. Again, this contrasts 
with the ambiguous predictions obtained for quote-driven institutions. 
Proposition 19 The greater the probability of 1minformed trade, 1 -1, the smaller is the 
bid-ask spread set by each market maker, and hence the smaller is the expected effective 
market bid-ask spread. 
Proposition 20 Let the price grid be reduced from d = k to d = � '  k > 0.  Then the
smaller the grid size, the tighter is the bid-ask spi,ead set by each market maker, and 
hence the tighter is the expected effective market bid-ask spread. 
Corollary 2 1  As the price grid size d becomes finer, expected total market maker profits 
on any order t fall, vanishing completely as the price grid becomes arbitrarily fine. 
Comparative statics on the division of market maker profits are slightly more am­
biguous. For orders where the bid-ask spread is at a minimum, it is clear that increases 
in uninformed trade raise market maker profits, finer price grids lead to lower profits and 
increases in 1\11 's share a raise M1 's profits at 1112 's expense. 
However, on orders where J\12 undercuts with positive probability, lvf1 's expected 
profits per share are just the probability that he is not undercut times d: w;(t) alone
determines Nf1 's expected profits per share, ( 1 - w2( t ) )d. Since w;(t) pins clown informed
trading behavior, it is clear that sharp results on the relationship between 1\11 's profits 
and a, / or d do not obtain. For instance, if increasing a leads 1\11 to set bid-ask spreads, 
it will increase his profits if a.ncl only if the probability that he is undercut is reduced. 
Clean results do not obtain even in the limit as a goes to one. 
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When M2 undercuts with positive probability, his profits equal C1:"ld, which are
falling in a, increasing in the price grid size, d, and independent of the level of inside
trade, ;. On transactions where he does not undercut, his profits are strictly less than 
(1-") d. " 
4 . 1  Ginsi Trading
The analysis is robust to so-called "Ginsi trading" . The unique Ginsi trading equi­
librium features the same insider strategy and expected effective price schedule as that 
detailed here. In the Ginsi equilibrium, rather than NI2 mixing over prices in equilibrium, 
both market makers split the orders, offering better prices on the fraction of the order 
which corresponds to J1!f2 's mixing probability. 
To see this is an equilibrium, observe that the risk neutral insider's trading decisions 
. are unaffected by whether the division is probabilistic due to mixing by Nf2 or determinis­
tic due to Ginsi trading. If the expected effective price schedules with and without Ginsi 
trading are the same, then insider trading decisions will be unchanged. Hence we must 
show that if insider trading decisions a.re not altered by Ginsi trading then the market 
makers will set the same expected effective price schedules. Nf2 receives the same profits 
from matching .M1 on the higher priced portion of the transaction as he does from under­
cutting and taking that portion himself, so he is indifferent between undercutting further 
and not. M2, however, maximizes profits by matching A11 on any portion where M1 sets
the lower price in order to receive a share of the profits. Since NI2 will always match or 
undercut A11 , A11 wants to minimize the number of round lots on which the lower price is
set: if M2 will undercut on at least the fraction of the order corresponding to the mixing 
probability, then M1 will offer the lower price only on that fraction of the order. Hence 
the equilibrium Ginsi price schedule corresponds to the equilibrium expected effective 
price schedule without Ginsi trading. Following the arguments of proposition 12, one 
can show that this equilibrium is unique. 
Thus, allowing Ginsi trading does not overturn any result. The discrete price grid 
introduces non-trivial strategic interaction among market makers and allows them to earn 
substantial profits. Even though market makers are "competitive" within the discrete 
institutional environment and can split orders finely, the discrete environment does not 
facilitate competition. 
The outcome would be different if traders could commit to only transacting with a 
single market maker. This has the effect of ma.king the price grid arbitrarily fine, since 
M2 can now win .the entire .transaction by undercutting Jl.![1 .on a single round lot of the
total transaction, thereby winning the entire transaction. Effectively, the strategic effect 
of the discrete price grid is overcome. In practice this commitment is not feasible, or at 
lea.st not observed: market orders a.re often split among several limit orders and perhaps 
the specialist. 
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4.2 Robustness 
In the case of absolute time priority, equilibrium outcomes are unchanged if market 
makers have multiple (infinitely many is equivalent to one) opportunities to undercut 
each other. For less strict priority rules, the effective equilibrium price schedules become 
less competitive when 1111 can submit improved quotes which match M2 's. Rather than 
receiving the entire transaction by undercutting 1111 's initial quote, 1112 only receives share 
a from being the first to set a better quote because M1 will match a profitable quote 
when he has the chance to move again. This reduces the incentives of M2 to undercut, 
and in turn, reduces the incentives of NI1 to initially set better prices.
Little changes if M1 adopts a mixed pricing strategy. Profit maximization requires 
that M1 place positive probability on at most two prices which differ by d. Let p(t) be
the higher price, and w; (t) be the probability that N/1 sets a price d lower. M2 matches
p(t) - d for sure, and undercuts p(t) with probability w�(t) = w2(t) - w;(t) (where w2(t)
is the probability M2 undercuts were A11 always to set price p1(t)), so that the aggregate
probability that price p(t) - d is set is unchanged and consistent with the equilibrium
beliefs of the informed traders, which determine 8*(t - 1 ) , 8*(t). For A11 to be indifferent
between setting p( t) or p( t) - d, w� (t) must satisfy
Hence while the equilibrium is not unique, both the equilibrium expected effective price 
schedule and insider trading strategies must be. 
5 Welfare 
Vve conclude by comparing the welfare properties of the quote and order driven in­
stitutions. In the case of absolute time priority, the price schedule set by Nl1 in the
order-driven institution where traders first submit orders is more competitive than the 
effective price schedule in the quote-driven institution where market makers first submit
price schedules, in the sense that the bid-ask spreads are uniformly tighter. Hence, the 
expected losses of uninformed agents are smaller when traders submit their orders first. 
This may explain why the NYSE features absolute priority, and traders submit their 
trades before market makers make their quotes, at least for larger orders. 
Proposition 2 2  Suppose there is absolute time priority. Then the effective price for 
each buy order in the quote-driven institution is at least as great as the price set by M1 
in the order-driven institution. Hence, on those transactions where 1112 undercuts with 
positive probability, the-expectedprice in the quote-driven institution is strictly lower than 
that which obtains in the order-driven instil1llion. 
Intuitively, when market makers set prices first, the informed respond strategically to 
the price schedule. Mixing over price schedules cannot discipline informed trade because 
the informed see the schedule realization before selecting their order, and wiii concentrate 
their trade where the price realization was "low" . This strategic informed response leads 
market makers to set less competitive price schedules. Hence, as Example 2 illustrated, 
traders earn greater profits by committiug - submitting orders first and then receiving 
price quotes. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper studies the impact of a discrete price grid on strategic pricing and inside 
trade in dealership markets .  The discrete environment means that prices are no longer 
determined by a zero expected profits condition for market makers. Discreteness effec­
tively limits competition and leads market makers to set uncompetitive and profitable 
price schedules. We show that priority rules and the timing of offers - do market mak­
ers submit price schedules first, or do traders first submit their orders and then market 
makers set prices - have significant effects on equilibrium outcomes. With quote-driven 
institutions where market makers submit price schedules first, "intuitive" comparative 
statics results need not obtain: the effective price schedule need not be monotonic in the 
probability of informed trade, the price grid size, or the priority rule. 
In contrast, order-driven institutions have sharp "intuitive" properties: the effective 
price schedule "improves" as the probability of inside trade falls, the price grid becomes 
finer, or as the first market maker receives a greater portion of the trade. Conditional on 
not being undercut on those transactions, the first market maker expects the substantial 
profit per share of exactly � ' which exceeds the grid size, d. This is important because it
suggests that the commonly used approach for empirical work in market microstructure 
of rounding to the nearest eighth is not appropriate. The second market maker expects 
a fraction of this profit whether or not he undercuts, where the fraction is decreasing 
in the first market maker's share of the transaction. These results are robust to Ginsi 
trading. Given that there are significant fixed costs associated with market making, the 
paper suggests that there is an optima.I price grid size, one which minimizes expected 
trader losses subject to a minimum profit requirement for market makers. Since market 
maker profits and trader losses are monotonically increasing in d, this grid size is unique. 
Finally, we find that the most competitive effective price schedule is set in the order­
driven institution where there is absolute time priority, as is the case on the NYSE. 
Traders get better price quotes in this environment than they do when they get to see 
price quotes first before submitting their orders. 
Because we impose little structure on the distributions of both information and liq­
uidity trade, the analysis can be embedded in more general environments. The extension 
is immediate to an economy where insiders observe the innovation with noise, and to 
any preferences for the insider which are monotone increasing in wealth. Because market 
makers care only about the expected value of the asset given the order size, perturbing 
preferences has an effect similar to perturbing the distribution of innovations (which is
unrestricted). Sunshine trading in which traders commit to executing the transaction 
several hours later can be incorporated by assuming that market makers recognize that 
such traders are less likely to be informed so that "their 1'' is smaller. Introducing com­
peting exchanges with the same price grid corresponds exactly to introducing additional 
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market makers, where the priority rule mandates a probabilistic division of the order if 
market makers on different exchanges set the same price. 
The analysis extends to dynamic environments where information is longer lived, 
where a trader may implement a dynamic trading strategy in which he splits his trade, 
provided that, as with Ginsi trading, the trades are handled independently. Intuitively, 
the solution to a traders' splitting problem just corresponds to a different distribution of 
trade (which is unrestricted), and which the market makers take into account.
The theory has implications for the magnitude of dynamic quote revisions. For in­
stance, after a large price movement, bid-ask spreads are likely to be wider because 
the expected value of the asset is generally a feasible price. In contrast, after smaller 
movements, the expected asset value is generally unchanged, so that quotes are not re­
vised. This means that it is possible to distinguish empirically the predictions of the 
order-driven model from those of inventory models. 
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Appendix: Proofs 
Proposition 1 .  (a) Suppose p2(t) < PI(t) - d. By increasing p2(t) to PI(t) - d, trade
with liquidity traders is unchanged, but revenues are increased, and expected losses 
with informed traders are no greater (strictly less if they continue to trade t) . Hence
P2(t) < PI(t) - d cannot be profit maximizing.
(b) Suppose the premise were not true, i .e.
I:: [(1 - 1)€(t)(p2(t) - 6)t + 1x*(t)(p2(t) - (6 + E [olt]))t*(o, p(·))J < o.
tlp1(t)>P2(t) 
But then, by increasing p2(t) on all such orders by d to PI (t) , expected losses are reduced
by more than: 
a[ L [(l - 1)€(t)(p2(t) - 6)t + 1x*(t ) (p2(t ) - (6 + E [o lt]))t*(o, p(·))]] > 0. 
tlp1(t)>p2(t) 
(c) Suppose PI(t) < p2(t) , hut
(1 - 1)€(t) (PI(t) - 6) + 1x*(t)(PI(t) - (6 + E[olt])) > o.
But if MI expects to make money 011 an order t, then A12 can earn positive profits by
matching the price. Informed trade at all levels is unaffected, as p(t) is unchanged. Hence
if MI sets a lower price than ,�12 's, it must be unprofitable for A12 to match i t .
(cl)  Suppose the premise were not true, i .e.
(1 - 1)€(t)(p(t) - 6)t + 1·x*(t)(p(t ) - (6 + E[olt])) < o but p,(t) = P2(t).
But if PI (t) = p(t), informed trade is unaffected if A12 sets price p2(t) > p(t) . Hence
M2 's expected profits are increased by a.voiding the loss incurred by potentially trading 
t. D 
Lemma 23 : Equilibrium price schedules can be boimded: i:!.+m-d :':'. Pi(t) :':'. l:!.+m+d; 
6 + m ::; p;(t) :':'. 6 + rn . 
Proof. Consider an order 0 < t ::; H, for which there is a. positive probability that
the trader is a liquidity trader. Suppose 1111 sets a price Pi( t) :'.". 6 + rn + d. Then M2 can
set a price p�(PI ( -) , t) = Pi(t) - d, and win the sale. Further, for such orders M2 earns
greater profits by doing so (and leaves 111I with none) , as pi(t) - d > (1 - a)pi(t) > 0 
(recall Mz's share is a.t most .5). This order is necessarily a liquidity trader's for such an
order is unprofitable. Since A12 's prices at other trade levels a.re unaffected by the choice
of Pi(t) :'.". 6 + m + d, J11I 's profits a.re unaffected by this choice. An analogous argument
for L :':'. t < 0, demonstrates that a lower bound 011 prices is 6 + rn - d. Hence the set of
25 
potentially optimal prices for lvf1 can be restricted to the set t:i.+m-d ::;  pi(t) ::; t:i.+m+d, 
and hence M2, who may undercut, to prices t:i. + m ::; p;(p1 ( · ), t) ::; !::i. + m. 0 
Proposition 2 .  For any innovation fi, and price schedules consistent with lemma 1 ,  
an informed agent's optimal order is contained in the set {L,  L + 1, . . .  , H} ,  a finite set.
Hence there is a best element. For any given price schedule of A11 , for each transaction
level { L, . . .  , H}, the set of possibly optimal prices for Af2 is contained in { t:i.+m ) , t:i.+m+ 
d, . . .  , t:i.+m }. Since the set { L, . . .  , H} is finite, as is { t:i.+m-d, t:i.+m+d, . . .  , t:i.+m+d},  
for any given price schedule of JVI1 there is  a best response for i'vf2• Analogously, there
must be a best price schedule for A11 . Hence an equilibrium exists. 
As the proof for t < 0 is analogous consider only buy orders. Suppose M1 's price
schedule is monotone in t : p1(t - 1) ::; p1(t). If p2(t) > p1(t) = p(t), arbitrarily
assign it the value p1 (t) + d. From Proposition 1 ,  if pz(t) < p1(t) is profit-maximizing
then pz(t) = p1 (t) - d. Suppose pz(t) < pz(t - 1 ) .  Then P2(t - 1) 2: p1(t - 1)  and
p( t - 1) = p1 ( t - 1 ) .  It cannot be the case that p1 ( t) > ]11 ( t - 1), else )J2 ( t) = p1 ( t) - d, so
that p2(t - 1) = p1 (t), and p(t - 1 ) = p(t): But then informed traders will not trade at
t - 1, so that M2 wants to at least match p1(t - 1 ) .  This implies that p1 (t) = p1(t - 1),
which, in turn, must equal p2( t - 1) since there will be no informed trade there. But if
p2(t) < p2(t - 1) then informed traders will still not trade at t - l, even if M2 undercuts.
Hence undercutting p2(t - 1) = p1(t - 1) - d yields 1112 greater expected profits. But
then his schedule is monotone. But then the effective price schedule is monotone. For 
if p(t) < p(t - 1), if p(t - 1)  = p1(t - 1), then .M2 increases his profits at p(t - 1)  by
undercutting p(t - 1)  by d. And if p(t - 1 )  = p 1 (t - 1)  - d, p1 (t ) 2: p1 (t - 1)  (by
assumption) , so that p2(t) 2: p1 (t - 1 )  - d. Monotonicity of p(·) in t follows.
Suppose now that JV[1 's schedule is not monotone, i.e. that p1(t - 1) > p1(t). Then
M2's profit-maximizing response is to set p2(t - 1 )  = p1 (t - 1) - d. Let lv[1 instead
quote a price p\ (t - 1) = p1(t) + d. Then the profit-maximizing response by M2 is to set
p;(t - 1) = p1(t), as there is no informed trade at t - 1 and the profits from the rest of
the schedule remain unchanged. Hence fi( t - 1) ::; p( t) as desired. The proof now follows
as above. 
An informed trader selects a transaction level, t* (fi, fi(·)), which maximizes (1 ) .  Sup­
pose that 5 > 0. Then for any given price, p, such tha.t !::i. + 5 - p > 0, the informed
trader maximizes profits by buying as much as he can a.t that price. D 
Corollary 1 .  Profit maximizing implies that this partition solves
Rewriting yields: 
( A + C* -(+* )·)t* _ ( A + C* -ft* \ ) ·t* - w · ui - - P '-'i i - \Ll  vi - p\ i+l J i+1 ·
Proposition 3 .  Consider t > 0. Without loss of generality consider the largest such
t such that JV[2 sets p;(t) :S t:i. .  Then his expected profits from such transactions are
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negative. For consider an innovation 8 < d. It is profitable for the insider to purchase t ,
but not to  purchase anything at a price greater than 6.. Expected profits from trading
with the uninformed a.re zero. If 1111 also sets that price, then informed trade i s  unaffected
if M2 raises his price of an order of t to p;(t) (leaving other prices unchanged) , and M2 
gains from not earning negative profits on t. If pi(t) > 6., then M2 gains on liquidity
trade by setting p;(t) = 6. + d, and does not lose to the informed even if he handles
them at some other transaction level (it must be less profitable for the informed, else
they would have traded there originally) . Hence Nh gains, receiving greater profits from
setting p;(t) = 6. + d for all t where he might set p�(t) = 6. .
Now suppose NI1 sets a price pi(T) S 6.. He receives informed demand at T but not
at lesser quantities. For r,  0 < 7 < T,  lvl2 optimally sets the same price he would were
p; (T) = 6. + d, as he would with the price Pi(T) S 6.: Informed trading is unchanged
(they do not trade) for such transactions. The only way for NI1 to earn profits on
r, 0 < r < T , is if Pi( r ) = 6. + d, as otherwise lt1z undercuts by d and win aU such sales:
it can only be possibly optimal to set a price p1 ( t )  < 6. + d for at most one t. Further,
setting p; (T) increases earnings from liquidity traders on T ,  and the total cost of informed
trade shifted to transactions T + 1 ,  . . . , H to both ,�11 and lt12 is bounded from above by the
cost of those informed to lt11 when they to trade at price Pi(T) for T ,  else the informed
could have increased their profits in the face of the original schedule by trading greater 
quantities, a contradiction. Since lt12 's expected profits on those orders T + 1 ,  . . . , H  do
not increase when 1111 sets p; (T), it must be that the increase in expected losses to lt11 at
these greater quantities is bounded from above by the reduction in expected losses from 
trading with the informed at T .  Hence, it could not have been optimal for M1 to set a.
price p,(T) S 6.. D 
Proposition 4. If a < 1 and ir1 > 0 then ir2 > 0 because 1112 can offer the same
schedule as f'.11 . To see that 1111 expects positive profits, consider the schedule
* -
{ 6. + m + d  t � l
P1 ( t) P1 t - 1 
6. - m - d  t s o
where PI is chosen so that given the effective price schedule at other trade levels 1Vl2 
would expect to earn non-positive profits trading one round lot a.t PI - d, but trade a.t
p1 is strictly profitable. MI will not be undercut on 1 unit and any other schednle must 
generate at lea.st these profits for him. lt12 's profits a.re a.t least what he would obtain 
from matching lt11 's schedule and may be greater. D 
Proposition 5 .  'vVe must show that. {p; ( t)}�L solves
H 
maxPi( l L [(l - ;)£(t)(p;(t) - 6.)t + ;x*(t)(p;(t) - (6. + E[o !t]))t*(fi, p�(·))]
t=L 
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s.t .  
L{T,, ..T1}(1 - 1)£(T;)[(pi(T;) + d - t::.)T; + 1x*(T;)(pi(T;) + d - (6 + E [8 IT;]))T;'(p(·), 8)] < 0,
for any collection of {T1, . . .  , T1} ,  T; < 0
L{T, ,. T1}[(1 - 1 )i'(T,)(Pi(T;) - d - t::.)T; + 1x*(T;)(pi(T;) - d - (6 + E[8 IT;]))Tt(l'(· ), 8)] < o,
for any collection of {T1 , . . .  , T; } ,  T; > 0.
As the proof is analogous consider only buy orders. Suppose that the so-called profit­
maximizing schedule by M1 leads N[i to undercut him on a set of orders {T1, . . . , TN} by
d (offering better prices for other orders is unprofitable). Further, if M1 were instead to
have set the schedule {p( · ) }  by setting !Yl2's prices on those orders Ti, . . .  , TN then it must 
be optimal for NI2 to undercut further as otherwise 1\11 's profits would be increased by
setting {p( · ) }  rather than the so-called optimal schedule (he obtains M/s non-negative 
profits and informed trade is unaffected) ,  a contradiction of profit maximization by M1 . 
Denote the non-empty subset of these transactions on which 1\12 undercuts by an ad­
ditional d by { T1 , . . .  Tj } ·  Thus, the price schedule features some order levels where M2 
undercuts M1 's so-called optimal schedule by 2d. But, by Proposition 3 this requires
that the so-called optimal price set by J\1[1 be at least 6 + 3d. Let 1\11 again set a sched­
ule which matches those prices. Now if 1\12 undercuts on no transactions other than
T1 , . . .  Tj , then l\11 's so-called optimal schedule could not have been optimal for the same 
reason as above. So suppose that this undercutting shifts informed trade such that it 
is also optimal to undercut on an additional set of orders {Y  1, . . .  , Y m }· But it must
be that p1(Y 1), . . .  , p1(Ym) ea.ch exceed min{p1(T1), . . .  JJi (Tj ) } ,  else when undercutting on
{ Y 1, . . .  , Y m }  even more informed trade is lured back to orders Y 1, . . .  , Y m than before
(that is, no informed traders who would trade quantities t < min{T1 ,  . . .  Tj} given the orig-
inal price schedule would prefer to trade a greater quantity Y 1, . . . , Y m given the revised
schedule. Put differently, it is just as profitable for J\12 to undercut on these transactions 
with the M1 's revised schedule as it was to undercut the original (which was assumed to 
be unprofitable). Hence transaction levels Y1,  . . •  , Ym must feature prices greater than 
6 + 3d, a contra.diction of the proposition's statement. D 
Proposition 6 .  We must show that for any v > 0,  there exists a ( > 0 such that
for d < ( , M1 's expected profits from handling order t are less than v. For a given
transaction level t > 0, and effective price schedule, {p(· ) } ,  observe that if schedule
{p' ( - ) }  = p(L), . . .  p(t - 1), p'(t) = p(t) - d, p(t + 1 ) ,  . . .  p(H) were set, that for a.ll v > 0 ,
there exists a. ( > 0 such that for d < (,  E7r(p'(t)) > E7r(p(t)) - v ,  and for T =I t , 
E7r(p (T)) 2 E7r(p(t)). That is, arbitrarily small price cuts have arbitrarily small effects
on informed trade and hence on profits given the continuous density f(-) for 8 .  
Hence, i f  E7r1(t) > v, 0 < a ::;  1 ,  there exists a. (, d < ( such that (1 - a)E7r2(p2(t) = 
p1(t)) < E7r2(p2(t) = p1(t) - d) (being slightly loose with notation) ,  and for any given
set of price quotes by the market makers, profits of J112 at all other transaction levels are
at lea.st as great when he undercuts 1111 on transaction t. Hence 1\11 's profits must go to
zero. D 
Lemma 24 In equilibrium, for t E {£, L + 1 ,  . . . , H} an upper bound for prices p£(t) is 
6 + m; and a lower bound for prices is given by: t::. + m: 6 + m  ::; p£(t) ::; 6 + m, i = 1 ,  2. 
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Proof. Analogous to that of Lemma 1 .
Proposition 7 .  Both market makers can ensure themselves non-negative expected
profits by setting price 6 + m. M2 can earn positive profits by matching M1 's price and 
sharing the transaction unless the l\11 's price leaves them with zero expected profits: 
(1 - ;)fi(t ) (P1 (t ) - 6)t + 1x* (8 lt)E[(p1 (t ) - (6 + 8) )t*(8) !t] = 0.
But then M1 can set price p; (t ) = p1 (t) + d, and earn positive expected profits since M2 
can earn positive profits if and only if he matches p; (t) and does not undercut .  It cannot
be optimal for M1 to set a price which is undercut for sure because that leaves him with 
zero profits: by setting a price which generates positive profits if matched and is such 
that were M2 to undercut he would not expect positive profits, l\11 can ensure himself 
positive expected profits. Since l\11 always expects positive profits, M2 can ensure himself 
positive profits by matching l\11 's price; l\11 never undercuts M2. D 
Proposition 8. Immediate. For t > 0,  a price p(t ) < 6 is unprofitable. But a price
of 6 is also strictly unprofitable. If price 6 is set with positive probability for transaction 
size t ,  then Ep,(tj[p(t) ]  < 6 + d since 1112 never undercuts 1111 by more than d. Define
T to be the trade size which maximizes T(6 + d - Ep,(Tj[p(T)] ) . Profits from liquidity
trade are zero, and an insider observing an innovation d - E < 8 < d, c small, will trade 
T. Since such innovations occur with positive probability, the market maker must expect 
negative profits, a contradiction of proposition 7. D 
Proposition 9 .  If the probability of insider trade for some trade size t > 0 is zero
and there is liquidity trade, then since a ::> .5, J\12 will undercut A11 with probability 1 if
p1 (t) > 6 + d, leaving l\11 with zero profits. But then 1111 cannot be maximizing profits
since l\11 can earn strictly positive profits by setting p1 (t ) = 6 + d. An informed trader
selects an order t* which maximizes ( 6 + 8 - p( t) )t .  An informed trader trading at a
price 6 + d maximizes profits by trading as much as possible at that price. Following the 
arguments above, there will be some inside traders who will see innovations 8, d < 8 < 
d+c, E small, who maximize profits by trading at that price. If the expected effective price 
schedule were not strictly monotone increasing in trade size for t > Ti , then E[p(t) ]  ::> 
E[p( t + 1 ) ]  some t .  But then there is no informed trade in equilibrium at t ,  so that M2 
should always undercut l\11 on trades of size t ,  a contradiction of proposition 7. Since for 
order sizes greater than T1 , there is an informed trader who expects positive profits equal 
to the market maker's expected losses, conditional on trading with an informed trader at 
the most attractive price for that trade size, the market maker expects to lose money. D 
Corollary· 3. For 8 E [-d, ti] , the insider does not trade. For other levels, the insider
can earn positive profits by trading. Profit maximizing implies that this partition solves 
(6 + s; - E[p(t) ] )t = (6 + s; - E[P(t + 1 ) J ) (t + i ) .
Rewriting yields: 
(6 + s; - E[p(t + l ) ] )  = (t + l ) (E[p(t  + l ) ]  - E[p(t) ] ) . D 
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Proposition 1 0 .  Follows from lemma 2 and profit-maximization. If the expected
profits to setting one price or the other were greater, then profit maximization requires 
that the more profitable price be set. Hence (2) must hold. D 
Proposition 1 1 .  From Proposition 10 ,  d = a(p1(t) - 6 - ,,.x• (tJ�;f�,,.)l(t) E[illt) ) ,  for
t = t, t + 1, . . . , t + j - 1 . ,,.x• (tJ�;f�,,.)£(i) E[illt) is the expected innovation given transaction
t from a market maker's perspective: neither market maker knows the identity, informed
or uninformed, of the trader with whom he transacts. This expected innovation does not 
vary a.cross order sizes for which }Yf1 offers the same price. Hence n, (p, (t)) - t(i-w;(t)) t -n1 (P1 (t)) - t(l-w;(t)) ' -
t, t + l , . . .  , t + j - 1 . D 
Proposition 1 2 .  Suppose the equilibrium expected effective price schedule is not
unique. That is, suppose there are at least two equilibrium expected effective price 
schedules, {EP2(t) [p'(t) ] }�i, # {Ep�(t) [p11(t) ]}�z,· Consider the greatest transaction T > 0, 
such tha.t there is a difference between the two schedules, where without loss of generality, 
E[p'(r)] < E[p11(r) ] .  Then 6;�1 ::;, 6;�1 , where the relationship is strict unless T = H.
If E[p'(r - l )] ::;, E[p11(r - 1) ] ,  then 6;' :S 6;11 so there is more informed trade a.t T in
equilibrium 1 than in the 11 equilibrium, and losses to informed tra.de a.re greater in the 1 
equilibrium. The level of liquidity trade at T is the same in both conjectured equilibria. It 
is then straightforward to show that this cannot be consistent with profit maximizing by 
both market makers in both equilibria.: if informed tra.de is greater then expected prices 
must be greater. Hence it must be the case that E[p'(r - 1) ]  < E[p11 (r - 1 )] ,  and tha.t
6;'_1 > 6;�1 .  Continuing this argument at r - 1 ,  it must be that E[:p'( r-2)] < E[p11( r-2)] , 
d '*' C.ll l . E{-'(  " ) }  E[-11 (- " )] l '*' > (<II . - 1 2 an u,,._2 > u7_2 , anc so o11. ]J T -J  < _, p 1 - J , anc u7_1 u7_j1 ) , , . . .  , T . 
But consider the least transaction level T > 0 such that there is informed tra.de in the '
equilibrium. It must be that E[p'(T)] < E[p11(T)] ,  and o]! < o]!', a contradiction. o 
Proposition 13.  Suppose not. Then there is a. least T > 0 such that Ep, (T) [pa,(r)] >
Ep, (T) [pa,, (r) ] .  Hence, 6;' > 6;11• Suppose that 6;�, ::: o;�,, so there is more informed
tra.de at T in  the 1 economy than the 11 economy. Consider any p1 ( T ) .  It is more at­
tractive to undercut p1 ( T) given a' than 011 even for fixed levels of informed trade
since the profits to offering a better price are independent of a and the profits to 
matching p1 ( T) fall with a, a contra.diction. Further if Pia•( r) > Pla" ( T) then equi­
librium in both economies necessa.rily requires 1112 to always undercut Pia•(r) , a con­
tradiction of profit maximizing by 1111 . Hence, it must be that 6;�1 > 6;�1, so that
Ep, (7+1) [pa, (r + 1 )] > Ev2(7+l) [p",, (7 + 1 ) ] .  Continuing this argument as in proposition
12, it must be that Sf{ > 6Ff' and Ep,(H) [Pa•(H)] > EvdHJ[p0,, (H)] .  But then there is less
informed trade at H in the / economy than the " economy, so it is more a.ttra.ctive to 
offer better prices at H in the ' economy, a contradiction. D 
Proposition 1 5 .  As in Proposition 13. As d falls, the minimum bid-ask spread
shrinks. Further, because M2 can undercut 1111 by a smaller quantity and obtain the 
entire order, undercutting is more profitable so market makers offer better prices. D 
Proposition 1 6 .  Index the price schedules when market makers set price schedules
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first by M, and price schedules set when traders submit orders first by T . By construction
when traders submit orders first, 1\112 's price schedule earns him zero expected profits.
Further, were the timing reversed so that market makers set price schedules first, then M2 
would expect strictly negative profits from pricing below pf ( · )  on any set of transactions.9 
Indeed for any schedule p�1( · )  > pf( · ) ,  the losses 1\11, expects from pricing below pf( · )  
on any set of trades are even greater than those which would obtain were M1 to set
schedule pf( - )  (it draws even more informed trade) .  Let {T1 ,  . . .  Tj} be the hypothesized 
set of transactions such that pf1 ( T) > p�1 ( T) 2': pf( T) . Let {p1 , .  .. pk} be the hypothesized
set of transactions such that pfl (p) = pf(p) > p�f (p) , i.e. those transactions where M2 
undercuts M1 when market makers move first and 1\111 sets the same price as when traders
move first. But , following the above argument, 1\11, would earn greater expected profits
by undercutting only on transactions T1 , • . •  , Tj , since undercutting on p1 ,  • . •  , Pk given
schedule pf( - )  is unprofitable. 
Finally, M1 never sets a price p{1(t)  < pf( t ) .  For suppose otherwise. He expects to
lose money on any transaction with price below pf ( t ) ,  and such pricing makes it more 
attractive for l'vf2 to undercut on other transactions. Rather than price below pf(t ) ,  M1 
does better to raise his prices a,t least to pf ( t ) .  Let z be the decrease in  losses on 
those transactions. Setting these higher prices leads Nh to undercut less since there is
more informed trade at other trade levels. Since those transactions where M2 no longer 
undercuts were profitable given the original schedule, a strict upper bound on the increase 
in losses for those order levels t where l\1'1 left his price unchanged (i.e. those t such that 
p1{1(t) 2': pf(t ) )  is z. Hence it cannot he optimal for !11'1 to set a price pfl(t) < pf(t ) .  D 
9When a = 1, the effective price schedule, profits and insider trade are unique, but the schedule set 
by M1 need not be if he receives exactly zero profits fro1n setting son1e price and taking the order, or 
setting a price d higher and getting undercut for sure. To fix arguments \Ve suppose that M1 sets his 
schedule so that he is not undercut 'vith probability one - this is j ust a convenience. 
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Figure la. 
Market Makers Set Price Schedules; Then Traders Submit Orders 
Time Line 
Time Line 
Identity of trader (informed) liquidity determined. If informed, see 5;  
liquidity trader learns demand t .  
Price schedule Pi ( · ) set by M1 . 
Price schedule Pi(Pi( · ) ,  · ) set by M2. 
Order submitted to market maker with best price (or split if same price) 
t is liquidity, t*(5, p( - ) )  if informed. 
Trade takes place. 
5 revealed. 
Figure lb. 
Traders Submit Orders; Then Market Makers Set Prices 
Identity of trader determined: informed see 5, liquidity learn demand 
t.  
Order submitted to market makers: t if liquidity, t*(  5) if informed. 
Price Pi (t)  set by M1. 
Price p:j (pi (t) , t)  set by M2 (determined by mixed strategy).
Order taken by market maker with best price (split if same price) .  
5 revealed. 
3 2  
$ 
$ 
Figure 2a 
Price Schedule (t> O) ,  when market makers set prices first 
Figure 2b 
Absolute time priority 
I Price g rid d 
• P1 (t) (= P (t))
O Inside trade
of quantity 
t
Price Schedule (t> O) ,  when orders are submitted first 
3 3  
Absolute time priority 
I Price grid d 
• p1 (t)
x EP(t) 
0 inside trade
at quantity 
" Expected asset value 
from market maker1s 
perspective, 
t given volume
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